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GOALS AND STRATEGIES FOR CHILDREN IN THE 19903: 
AFRICAN PROSPECTIVES
By Reginald Herbold Green
Frustrations and failure will mount if we do not 
immediately summon the courage to revise the ways we think 
and take action... saving hundreds of thousands... who are 
at risk of dying... is an immediate imperative. But it 
must be only one stage in progress toward other activities, 
and one element in the truly comprehensive approach.
- Cheik Amadou Kane
Since the human being is the centre of all development, the 
human condition is the only final measure of development. 
Improving that condition is essential for the poor and 
vulnerable human beings who comprise the majority of our 
peoples in Africa. Africa's men and women are the main 
factors and the ends for whom and by whom any programme and 
implementation of development must be justified.
- Khartoum Declaration
I.
SSA In The Global Context: Economic, Social, Demographic
Sub-Saharan Africa's people comprise under a tenth of the world's population - 
500 million - in almost a third of its countries - 47 including Namibia and 
the Sahara Democratic Republic. The average population of about 10 million is 
somewhat misleading as 215 million live in five countries with 20 million to 
over 100 million (Nigeria, Ethiopia, Sudan, Tanzania, Kenya) while about 11 
million live in the 15 with under 2 million inhabitants each. About 250 
million live in countries with 5 to 15 million inhabitants.
SSA economies are poorer than those of any other region with an average output 
per head of the order of $500 or less. This again is misleading for two 
reasons. First, about 40$ of SSA's people live in countries whose per capita
2output on current exchange rates is below $250 (significantly below the $300 
odd of India and China or Haiti). Second, the proportion in absolute poverty 
(comparable to the bottom 40$ of the Indian household income distribution) is 
of the order of at least 40$ for SSA as a whole and regularly over 60$ in 
several cases (e.g. Mozambique, Namibia, probably Sudan and Ethiopia) as well 
as rising to that level in more during drought disasters (e.g. several Sahel 
States and Ghana in 1983). SSA therefore is the poorest region in the world 
nationally and in percentage of human beings living in absolute poverty.
It also is the only region whose 1990 per capita output will be significantly 
below 1970 because of growth rates of output somewhat below population in the 
1970s and even more so in the 1980s. While serious data problems exist, an 
average per capita fall of 20$ would appear to be of the right order of 
magnitude. Latin America and the Caribbean have also had per capita falls in 
the 1980s but less general and less sharp, and from higher initial levels.
The region's people are somewhat less literate, less formally educated and 
with less access to public health services than in other regions albeit on 
average the difference with Asia is not large and until the 1980s was 
diminishing. More clearly SSA has higher birth rates, higher death (and 
especially infant mortality) rates and higher population growth than any other 
region. Life expectancy at birth is in the low 50s, infant mortality over 100 
(with only Botswana and Cape Verde under 70) and under 5 over 175 (with only 
the same pair of countries under 100). Crude birth rates average slightly 
under 50 and crude death rates somewhat under 20 with population growth of the 
order of 3 to 3£$ a year. (For comparison India U5MR is 152 with life 
expectancy at birth 59, crude birth and death rates 32 and 11 and annual 
population growth 2.2$.)
It is necessary to warn that SSA demographic data are sketchy, fragile and 
often unanalysed. In particular official UN U5MR and IMR as well as life 
expectancy estimates are at present seriously biased and will continue to 
present an inadequately gloomy picture until 1983-92 census round data are 
available and used in projections. At present most estimates are based on 
projections of trends between a 1960s and a 1970s census and therefore cannot 
take into account the loss of life expectancy and life resulting from the 
1980-1989 depression years.
3In summary most Africans live in countries which are somewhat smaller in 
population than those typical of other regions and very substantially poorer 
in output per capita. In absolute poverty terms Africans are up to 20-25% of 
all absolutely poor people versus under 10? of all absolutely poor, not so 
poor and not poor people.
Humanly, Africans tend to live less long and especially to be more likely to 
die before 5 and have slightly less likelihood of access to literacy, primary 
education and public basic health services than Asians and radically less than 
residents of other regions. Because of sustained negative per person output 
growth (low absolute growth exacerbated by rapid population increases which 
are themselves largely the result of poverty, low educational access and high 
Under 5 mortality) the relative position of Africans has, on average, worsened 
economically, nutritionally, socially and demographically since 1980. They 
remain on a downward trend as the 1980s close with, at most, a slowing of the 
rate of decline and more exceptions - i.e. countries and groups of poor people 
clawing upward.
The Colonial Heritage
Most of SSA had a later, shorter and less intensive colonial era than Latin 
America and the Caribbean and even than Asia with the exception of China, 
Japan and Thailand. That fact is often lost to sight because of the 
relatively recent advent of independence (beginning with few exceptions at the 
end of the 1950s and still incomplete) compared to Latin America and - with a 
much lesser temporal gap - Asia and the Caribbean. A reinforcing factor in 
the perception of lengthy, pervasive colonialism is the numbers of expatriate 
personnel in SSA relative to other regions and the pervasiveness of external 
policy advice (or 'advice') in virtually all African states throughout the 
post-colonial period.
The socio-cultural impact of colonialism in Africa was more severe than in 
most of Asia (the Philippines is a clear exception with several centuries of 
feudal Spanish social relations overlaid by a thin, brittle social and 
institutional surface painting from the USA) albeit much less so than in Latin 
America and the Caribbean where the indigenous populations (even where in a 
majority) have never regained self-determination. In general it is fair to
say that political structures and processes beyond community level were 
usually either broken by conquest or distorted and eroded by co-optation. 
Household, community, patronage and kinship/ethnic group structures were less 
systematically damaged and often adapted (perversely it can be argued in the 
case of ’tribes') to new roles within (but often subversively so) the colonial 
political, institutional and economic system.
However, effective colonial rule in SSA was usually brief enough (well under 
100 years in most cases, and barely 60 in a substantial number of areas) not 
to lead to new imported or syncretic social or political structures with 
territorial bases as did happen in Latin America, the Caribbean (except Haiti) 
and the Philippines among more colOTiial import based and India and Sri Lanka 
among more indigenously influenced cases. Damage or destruction was rarely 
followed by effective rooting of imported or regrouping of indigenous systems. 
Arguably this was exacerbated because pre-colonial African states had usually 
had relatively brief lives, often were ethnic group based but territorially 
migratory and rarely corresponded closely to the post-colonial territorial 
states.
A factor in this result of destruction without reconstruction was the abortion 
of the late 19th Century flowering of black and creole African elites on the 
West Coast from Dakar to Luanda and also in Cape Town and Lorenco Marques. 
These played substantial modern economic sector, middle level employment and 
even second level political (up to an Acting Governor in the Gold Coast) 
roles. Had this process continued - as it did in the Indian Subcontinent - 
arguably much more firmly rooted political and social systems at territorial 
level and greater African middle level economic participation and human 
investment (education and employment) levels would have pertained at 
independence. Why the reversal occurred (Intensified economic exploitation? 
Elite unemployment in Europe? Enhanced interest in national grandeur 
exemplified by greater physical presence in colonies? Rising levels of 
racism?) is not clear; the fact that it happened is readily identifiable as 
are the probable consequences sketched above.
The colonial economic impact was uneven and ambiguous. It is not at all clear 
whether output grew much faster than population over 1850-1960 in West Africa 
or 1900-1965 in Eastern and Southern Africa and The Horn. On average 2 to 3% 
output and 1.5? t 2% population growth trends are probably as good colonial
5era guesstimates as can be produced, but with 1925-1945 output growth barely 
matching population because of a sustainedly hostile external economic 
environment.
This record is probably better than that of the immediate pre-colonial 
decades. Colonial rule did, on balance, increase law and order defined in 
terms of ordinary people being able to get on with producing and living with 
less danger of violent interference and it suppressed tibe slave trade. As 
pre-colonial intervention (often amounting to pre-oolcunlal neo— colonialism) 
had greatly exacerbated violence up to arid including .full scale inter state 
wars in Africa and had created the demand side essential to the long distance 
slave trade, this is not praise of colonialism nor an assertion as to what 
pre-European intervention growt’to rates in - say - i±>e 7600s or early 1700s may 
have been.
Colonial rule also led to an expansion of ^production for export and of 
infrastructure to service it. These did no± primarily: benefit Africans when 
settlers or foreign private enterprises were tteie producers albeit both they 
and the construction/operation of the Infrastructure did provide some 
employment. When - as in West Africa amd iffi tine late colonial period more 
broadly - the main export crops were largely prssduceif by African smallholders 
or small planters, the gains were greater and more integral to altering 
African production patterns. Compared to Asia, £ifrican economic participation 
was truncated at fairly low scale and income 1-rarels.
The same after the 1890s and before the 1950s -was also true of employment and 
(relatedly) education. The numbers and levels a^yeessible were limited both as 
to wage employment and as to education. The latter was largely functional in 
the sense of being related to spiritual needs and expected economic roles of 
Africans; the latter being one reason for its expansion and upward extension 
after 1945.
On nutrition, poverty and health the colonial period usually provided real 
but limited gains. In most SSA countries the land frontier was open until the 
late 1960s or the 1970s - export and domestic industrial input production 
rarely competed for land with domestic food production in any absolute sense 
albeit the increase on both fronts seems to have been at the expense of 
aising women's total workloads in many countries. Famine prevention (market
6broadening and at least minimal government safety nets) was generalised in 
colonial SSA in the 1930s, providing a form of security pre-colonial SSA 
states had usually found beyond their capacity. However, especially in the 
1925-45 period, nutritional levels may have worsened with falls in wage 
employment and in real commodity prices as well as settler/plantation land 
alienation among the basic causes.
Poverty patterns therefore altered in structure more than they changed in 
average levels. Certainly some groups became clearly non-poor especially 
among middle sized cash sale oriented farmers and ranchers as well as middle 
traders and clerks. The flowering of West and Southeastern African black 
elites in the late 19th Century, while cut short, did not in general end with 
their return to poverty. Some groups were made poor - notably those who lost 
land in settler colonies and traditional elite leaders of resistance. But 
most Africans simply remained poor - as small farmers with limited access to 
income beyond household self-provisioning, as wage earners (often male 
migrants to towns which led to social dislocation and weakening of the rural 
economy more often than to an ivestible surplus to plough back into 
agriculture or herding) or in the small scale (petty) "informal" commercial 
and service sector. Less disorder and violence and - after the 1920s - better 
security against starvation did benefit them but neither substantial rises in 
cash and kind incomes nor access to education and health care were common 
outside major cities until the 1950s twilight of the colonial era. While 
starvation and near starvation during crises were radically reduced, 
malnutrition probably was not although the open land frontier limited it 
largely to orphans, aged without family and labour short female-headed 
households.
The Transitory Transition
SSA's states became independent from 1957 (Ghana) through 1990 (Namibia). 
However, in virtually every case the actual period of transition was five 
years or less. In itself that might not have posed a massive challenge - the 
period between a firm time table for independence and its arrival was not 
usually markedly longer in Asia or the Caribbean. Nor was independence at the 
end of armed struggle (Angola, Guinea Bissau, Mozambique, Zimbabwe) unique. 
Indonesia in Asia and most Latin American states followed the same route.
7However, the initial instability of Latin America (except Brazil with its 
negotiated separation from Portugal) and Indonesia should be borne in mind.
The SSA context was different:
a. African cultural and political superstructures were more fractured and 
less reintegrated than in Asia and the settler dominated Latin American 
state model had no real parallels;
b. rapid transition left non-intregated Western institutional models which 
had not had time to be adapted or put down roots and with very few fully 
trained - let alone experienced - Africans to run them;
c. the African economies territorially and the African business cadres in 
particular were weak and heavily externally dependent (more so than in 
the larger Asian states or even the Caribbean);
d. in the poorest territories - which the colonial powers had never found it 
worthwhile to exploit economically (e.g. Burkina) - there was next to no 
dynamic economic base at all;
e. education, health, pure water and extension services - while varying 
sharply in extent and quality from state to state - were generally thin 
on the ground, recently expanded from very small bases and overwhelmingly 
dependent on expatriate or settler personnel.
This was a narrow and shaky objective base - a fact often obscured by the 
genuine mass popularity of initial independence movements or coalitions whose 
internal fractions and fractures were largely hidden by their common 
commitment to independence. Further, most colonial states believed that 
economic and policy control would remain in their hands via foreign 
enterprises, expatriate professional personnel and installation of 
pro-metropot, Europeanised political elites. The last often led to severe 
tensions even before independence while the first two were a continuing source 
of external and internal strain after. The colonial powers that doubted their 
ability to sustain neo-colonialism (Portugal, South Africa) had to be
dislodged by armed struggle while the second strongest African settler group 
(Southern Rhodesia) sought to sustain white independence as the strongest 
(South African) continues to do.
However, while the violent later transitions to independence and a few of the 
earlier quasi-consentual ones (e.g. Cameroon, Guinea) were marked by chaos and 
varying degrees of violence, most independent African states made the initial 
transition with more serenity than might have been expected. Similarly they 
did, at least until the 1970s, operate production growth in a largely export 
oriented context plus gradual (or even rapid) expansion of access to basic 
services more rapidly and arguably more competently than their colonial 
predecessors. In the poorest states that arguably was an achievement from so 
low a base as to be very inadequate but in others, e.g. Kenya, Tanzania, 
Ghana, Malawi, Cote d'Ivoire, Cameroon, Botswana and Zambia the economic and 
social achievements of the first decade of independence were by no means 
negligible.
In retrospect that transition was weaker than it appeared:
First, the external economic environment was basically favourable and the 
departing colonial regimes had left undone much export and easy import 
substitution development which would have been possible and profitable even in 
their strategies;
Second, the buildup of services started from a low base and in a favourable 
fiscal context (rising export and import base for trade taxes) concealing its 
potential resource availability limitations if pushed to universal access 
especially in a leaner fiscal context;
Third, independence coalitions unravelled as fractional interests diverged and 
were rarely succeeded either by genuinely broad based, rooted single parties 
or multi-party competition - an evaluation leading (except perhaps in Southern 
Africa) to a high number of coups, of military governments and of governments 
isolated from civil society and tending to authoritarianism;
Fourth, rapid indigenisation of personnel combined with rapid governmental, 
social service and economic expansion led to many senior personnel with 
limited training and/or experience. While in some states learning on the job
9proceded well in the 1960s and 1970s this was not universally true (Ghana's 
and Uganda's civil services - once the best in Anglophone Africa - were empty 
shells like white ant attacked furniture well before 1980). Further, the 
repeated shocks of the 1980s overtaxed even the best African personnel and led 
to rapid erosion of ability to cope even when this had been impressive during 
the briefer, less severe shocks of 1973-75.
Fifth, a parallel process of erosion or corrosion (and in several cases 
downright perversion) afflicted imported, weakly rooted institutions. Genuine 
indigenisation by adaptation and internalisation was uneven and more often 
than not the exception rather than the rule.
Sixth, the commitment to mass access to basic services and poverty alleviation 
was usually, though not always (vide Tanzania), a more fragile plant than it 
appeared. When resources were scarcer the slogan of elites was all too often 
"what we have we hold" and for the poor as in sinking four class liners "they 
put them down below where they'd be the first to go".
Seventh, in from the late 1960s the average weather patterns became less 
favourable and population pressure began both serious erosion of the 
traditional long rotation system (so-called "shifting cultivation") and 
pushing the crop land frontier into marginal pastoralist areas and 
pastoralists into even more marginal savannah verge/bad year neo-desert areas.
Eighth, urbanistion (from 5% in 1960 to 17% in 1970 to 25? in 1980 to about 
33% in 1990) raised the food surplus per peasant household needed to feed 
urban areas even as relatively static technology, environmental degradation 
and use of poorer land prevented sustained growth in productivity in most 
countries.
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II.
1960's Through 1980's: From Progress to Disaster
In the 1960's most of SSA had growth of overall output in excess of 
population. In the 1970's the picture was more mixed by country and sub- 
period. A number of countries including the major mineral exporters (eg. 
Zambia) and ill managed economies (eg. Ghana) as well as those torn by war 
(eg. Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia) had declines in per capita output, 
moreover the approximate balance between population and output growth and the 
decade came from a good 1976-79 following crises in 197^- 75 and quite poor 
average 1970-73 performance. Typically output per person rose 10% to 20% in 
most SSA economies in the 1960's, rose 10% to fall 20% in the 1970's and fall 
15% to 30% for as I96O-I988 outturn in the range of +5% to -30% for most 
economies.
Food production has fared even worse. In the second half of the 1960's it 
rose perhaps 2% (population 2.5 %), in the 19 7 0's somewhat under 2% 
(population 3%) and in the I98O about 2% (population at or above 3%)- This 
suggests on average 20% fall in food output per capita over 25 years. Even 
assuming an increase in net food imports from 1% to 6% of consumption (in 
calorie terms) leaves a 15% per capita fall in consumption. As even in the 
1960's SSA was characterised by "hungry seasons" in poorer rural areas (and 
for poor farmers in many more) and significant urban malnutrition, the trend 
confirms micro and sketchy material studies following malnutrition at crisis 
levels (frequently over 33% moderate and severe in under 5's).
The increased land pressure has speeded up environmental degradation. So too 
has the increased fuel pressure relating to urban as well as rural dwellers. 
This is especially true because most peasant African agricultural systems are 
ill adapted to extensive, short (or no) rotation cultivation and - together 
with deforestation and debushing for fuel - this interacts negatively with 
the drought cycle. For example in the 1960's the harmattan desert wind 
reached Accra quite briefly and carried little dust. By 1989 it could last 
for ten weeks and carry so much dust as to blot out buildings under 200 
metres away. That is the result of forest belt destruction and more 
intensive cultivation of the interior savannahs.
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Social indicators appear to be behaving rather differently from ecological, 
nutritional and output. In many countries their rise continued well into the 
1980's and even to date. Unfortunately many of these gains are unreal:
a. quality is not measured - rising school enrollment - (by no means any 
longer universal) can hide disastrous quality declines;
b. in the 1980's government health service visits per person per year have 
declined in many countries (catastrophically in Ghana and Zambia) in 
addition to quality falls;
c. serviceability means that certain capacity gains - notably in rural 
water supply - are not mirrored in numbers actually able to use the 
facilities; eg. in Tanzania on average 25# of rural water supply 
systems were non-functional at any one time by 1985 and about 50# had 
more than short outages in any one year;
d. life expectancy and infant mortality data are normally estimated and 
projected from the last two censuses. If previous downward trends have 
stagnated or reversed since the last census, then the supposed progress 
is a spurious artifact of the estimation process. On the ground data 
suggest that this is the case in eg. Ghana and Tanzania (at least until 
19 8 5), Malawi and Zambia, Mozambique and Angola.
There are a few positive - uneven - trends. These include
immunisation/vaccination and access to oral rehydration (albeit used lags at 
20# odd as 50# knowledge/access). So too - in a rather despairing way - has 
emergency food relief distribution. The record of few deaths from starvation 
unless war interacted with drought which began in the 19 2 0's and 19 3 0 's has 
been maintained despite the much greater relief needs of the 1980's. 
(Ethiopia was an exception to the development of capacity to avert drought 
deaths. It may still be - vide 1973"^ ” even though the levels of life last 
in the 1980's were clearly vastly increased by the war situation both 
directly and in its diversion of reserves.)
These are valuable gains - they save lives. That is a first priority - the 
dead cannot look forward to an improvement in their human condition. But by 
themselves they cannot answer the question "Survival for what?"
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SSA data are notoriously fragmentary, inconsistent with each other and bad. 
They are not even reasonably comparable across countries at any one time nor 
necessarily so in the same country over time. The following tables, 
nonetheless, seek to present selected data giving an empirical feel for the 
situation and evolution described.
Poverty, Survival and All What?
In SSA today poor people are more numerous absolutely and relative to total 
populations than at any time since i960 and probably since the mid-1940's. 
(The mid 19^0's were in themselves a worse context - at least on average 
household income - than the early 1920's.) Because absolute poverty is 
endemic in households with high ratios of children to economically active 
adults the proportion of children in absolute poverty is higher than for 
Africans as a whole - fairly certainly near half in urban and about two 
thirds in rural areas.
Poverty did not intensify uniformly. First, urban poverty exploded upwards 
as the brief 1960's rise of real minimum wages to near a household's basic 
needs basket was held down to that level in the 1970's and radically eroded 
in the 1980's and as urbanisation outstripped urban job or remunerative 
"informal" sector opportunity growth. Second, victims of drought, war and of 
population growth pushing into poorer and more vulnerable (and drought prone) 
land moved rapidly from vulnerability to absolute poverty. Without the 
resources to rehabilitate their livelihood most remained absolutely poor. 
These two categories comprise up to 50 million persons each or, together, 20% 
of SSA’s population.
It is not very useful to argue whether inequality has increased or decreased 
in the 1980's. Because economic decline has been characterised by very rapid 
erosion of real wages and - usually - by real received grower food prices 
(whatever the official price) rising relative to wages, it is quite likely 
household income inequality fell with poor urban households often becoming 
poorer than most peasant ones. However, that is scant comfort for the new 
poor or the barely not poor whose real incomes have fallen. Much less is it 
any consolation to those already in absolute poverty who have been pushed yet 
deeper into the morasse. Further it almost certainly does not hold in most 
countries for basic services which have been eroded from the periphery 
(geographic but in the income level as well as the purely physical sense) 
inward.
< Table 1. Selected quality of life indicators? 1960 ■ mid-1980s */
Ghana
Lov income sub-
1960 1970
Late
1970s 1980s
Saharan Afrli 
(1982)
Average life expectancy
at birth 45 49 55 53 48
Infant mortality rate 132 107 86 107-120 118
Child death rate 27 21 15 15-30 24
Access to health
facility bf - - - 30 45
Public health facility
visits per person per year - - 0.7 0.4 2(f)
Health budget as X of GDP - 1.2 • 0.26 0.95
Acceas to pure water c/
Rural - 14 14 48 14
Urban - 86 86 75 62
Total - 35 35 60 22
Access to excreta disposal 
Rural
±f
40 40 30 25
Urban - 92 95 65 69
Total - 55 56 44 32
Average calorie avail­
ability as a X of 
requirements 92 97 88 68 91
Child malnutrition
(aoderate/aevere) - - 36 50-55 40
frimary education
enrolment ratio e/ 38(46) 64(75) 69(80) -(80) 69(-
Adult literacy 27 30 - 35-45 44
Education budget as
I of GDP - 3.9 - 0.85 2.81
Proportion of population 
below absolute poverty line 1] 
Rural 60-65 67-H- 65
Urban - - 30-35
72-%
45-50 35
Sourcesi World Bank, Comparative Analysis and Data Diviaion, Economic 
Analysis and Projections Department (June 1984), World Development Report 
1985$ UNICEF, Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries (April 
1953); m m *  C l . . Cimaclon Analysis of Women and Children (July 1984).
SELECTED QUALITY OF LIFE INDICATORS - SOUTHERN AFRICA 19B4 AND I^Ob anl> aunrl,±h i^oh
Angola Botswana Lesotho Malawi Mozambique Swaziland Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe Somalia^
Population (millions) 8.5/9.0 1.1/1.1 1.5/1.6 6.9/7.2 14.0/14.3 0.6/0.7 22.0/23.3 6.5/6.9 8.5/9.1 5.5
Under-5 mortality
(per 1,000 births) 325-375a
(Same)
100/96 145/140 280/270 325-375a 
(Same)
185/178 185/179 135/132 120/118 174-210
Infant mortality (0-1)
(per 1,000 births) 200a
(Same)
75/79 110/112 160/153 200a 
(Same)
125/120 110/107 85/82 75/74 146-180
Infant and child
malnutrition (?) NA/NA 32/31 NA/NA 31/30 NA/37 NA/31 (50)/40 28/NA NA/NA 16
Average calorie intake
relative to
requirements (?) 87/86 (94)/95 100/100 97/95 79/68 (108)/NA 101/99 89/85 89/84 (105)
Access to health
services (30)/30 (89)/89 NA/NA 80/80 (30)/30 NA/70 (70)/76 75/75 71/71 (20)
Access to safe water 21/28 (76)/65 (14) /14 (41)/51 (13) /13 48/45 (47)/50 46/47 (52)/52 33
Primary enrolment K K h h
(?) (1982)° 66/61 7 6 / 9 3 71/127 46/41 46/45 84/110 87/68 94/84 131/126 15
Adult (over 15) h
literacy (?) (1982) 28/29 61/73 70/62 (36)/52 27/55 (60/70 8 5 / 9 3 69/84 69/81 16
One-year-olds fully h
vaccinated (?) TB 40/59 70/67 91/91 72/79 (46)/45 95°/91 (84)/82 87/82 88/76 31
DTB 8/20 82/64 59/82 66/54 (56)/32 79h/94 (58)/62 49/64 68/63 22
Polio 55/44 77/60 64/80 68/55 (32)/32 60°/74 (56)/62 47/46 63/63 22
Measles 62/44 75/62 63/73 64/42 (32)/39 5 1 / 7 4 (82)/67 56/55 55/53 36
Life Expectancy at birth (4D/44 55/56 50/51 46/47 (45)/47 54/50 52/53 52/53 56/57 45-49
GNP per capita 490/480 960/840 530/470 180/170 (230)/170 790/670 210/180 470/390 760/680 (350)
( ) = 1980 (or nearby year). Somalia re-estimated to include unrecorded remittances.
3 Re-estimated on fragmentary data taking into account impact of war. Standard projections showing 245 under-5 
mortality for Angola and 255 for Mozambique assume continuation not reversal of rapid 1975-1980 immediate 
post-independence period gains.
c  1 9 8 3
d Net ratios except for Tanzania, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
Includes etimates from various unpublished UNICEF studies at various dates 1982 through 1986.
Sources: 1984 Statistics on Children in UNICEF Assisted Countries, UNICEF, 1986, The State of The World's Children 1987, 
Oxford for UNICEF, 1987, UNICEF, Children On The Front Line , 1989 for 1988, except for GNP per capita taken 
from World Bank World Development Report 1986, OUP. WED/FAO Rural Household Survey, 1983*
Table 3
Selected Indicators Low and Middle Income SSA1
Indicator
GDP/Capita
GDP Growth
Food Production Growth
Daily Average Calories
Cereal Imports (000,000 t)
Food Production Per Capita 
Growth of:
Govt. Consumption 
Private Consumption 
Investment
External Trade Growth 
Imports 
Exports 
Population Growth
IMR
Life Expectancy At Birth 
% u rD a m sa t io n
1965
290
( 1965/80 )
5.1
1.7 
1965 
2096 
i97n
3-96
(79-81 r 100)3 
( 1965/80)
8.3
3-9
9.3
5.0
6.6
2.7 
1965
160
NA
1965
14
1987
330
(1980/87)
0.4
1.22
1984
21012
1987
7.81
(1985/87)
107
(1980/87)
- i . o 14
1.15
-8.3
-5.8
- 1.0
3.2
1987
115
51
1987
27
Notes
1. From World Bank, World Development Report 1989, OUP for World Bank.
2. The 1965-87 food production and population growth trends (corrected for 
food imports) would give a decline of the order of 25% not a nominal 
increase.
3. 1979-81 were on or below trend line output and 1985-87 above.
4. -4? per capita and up to -6$ if corrected for higher debt service share.
5. -2% per capita.
RATES OF ENVIRONMENTAL DEGREDATION
TABLE 4
Sand dune Deterioration Deterioration Rainfed
encroach­ in Forest of agricultural General
Countries ment rangelands depletion irrigation problems assessment
Benin 0 • • 0 i i
Burkina Faso o * i • ii •
Cape Verdi i * • ii • /ii
Chad i* «« • ii ii ii
Djibouti • ii • ■ NA i/ii
Ethiopia • n ii • i i/ii
Gambia • • ii ii i i
Ghana o • • • i
Guinea 0 o i i • I ■
Guinea Bissau 0 o i i i •
Kenya o ii ii i I i
Mali • ii ii i • i/ii
Mauritania * • • ii i I ■ 1
Niger * • • i ii i i/ii
Nigeria o • ii ft ft
Senegal * i • ftft ftft
Somalia « • i ii ft ft
Sudan • • • • i
ft
Tanzania o • i *
ft ft
Uganda 0 •• 0
ft
ja
ft
£
United Rep.Cameroon o i ■ 0
•
M
Zimbabwe 0 « • 0
ft W
Mozambique o * ** ** ★ */**
KEY: o = Stable, * = Some increase, •* = Significant increase, NA = Not appplicable 
Source: (Adapted) "Desertification Control Bulletin", United Nations Environment Programme,
Number 10, May 1984, p. 26 and national data. Updated to 1988.
Figure 1 Grain production per capita in 24 African countries affected by drought. 1970-1984
(Updated to 1988)
o l_____ 1______ 1______1______1______I______I______ 1______I______ I_____ I______ I______ 1______I_____ J
1970 1975 1980 1984 1988
S n u r t c  W o r l d  B a n k .  T o *  a r d  S u s t a i n e d  D e \ e l u p m r n i  in  S u b - S a h a r a n  A l r i i  a  4 J o i n t  P r o g r a m  o l  .-)< n u n  ( W  a s h i n g t o n .  D  C 19X4 ). p  14 . b a s e d  o n  d a t  j 
o l  t h e  I o o d  a n d  N g r i c u l t u r c  O r g a n i z a t i o n  o f  t h e  L n u e d  N a t i o n >  i K A O ) .  e x c e p t  t h a t  t h e  19x 4 f i g u r e  is a  p r o j e c t i o n  u s i n g  d a t a  f r o m  F A O .  t h e  U n i t e d  
S t a t e s  \ g e n c v  f o r  I n l e r n a t i o n a l  D e v e l o p m e n t  a n d  t h e  L n i i e d  S i a t e v  D e p a r i m c n t  o f  A g r i c u l t u r e
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Similarly the claim that Africans have survived while true for most does not 
necessarily give grounds for much optimism. Certainly it is an achievement 
and one largely won for themselves by poor Africans. But:
First, many have not survived. The direct and indirect effects of recession 
in Africa probably mean that at least 2 million persons a year die who would 
have lived had late 19 7 0's trends continued.
Second, the price of survival has been high in eroded living standards and 
increased necessary labour time. The latter has fallen particularly heavily 
on women (especially urban women) because the increasing inadequacy of wage 
incomes and increasing relative scarcity of wage employment has forced 
households to have more economically active members and more secondary 
(overwhelmingly "informal") sources of income.
Third, the means to survival have been rural (agricultural) and urban 
("informal") self employment/non-recorded wage employment. Both sponges are 
dangerously near saturation. In many SSA countries the outward thrust of 
population has put crop growers onto lands suitable only for extensive 
pastoralism and herders onto lands which in drought years are death traps for 
their herds. Further this process has speeded up environmental degradation. 
In Kenya alone 500,000 people are estimated to be on unsuitable lands of this 
type. In urban areas the pettiest of petty trading and casual, unskilled 
labour have helped eke out survival but much of the increase in numbers 
appears to have shared income and work (and poverty) with nominal, if any, 
production gains. Neither process can continue indefinately and probably not 
to 2000.
Similarly the nature of the food problem has caused a debate where too 
extremes are that 20-25% of SSA’s people are dependent on imported grain and 
that food shortages are marginal, transitory urban problems. Neither 
contention holds up, but the doomsday scenario the former serves to 
illustrate is less unrealistic than the latter's facile optimism.
About 5 to 6% of SSA's total food consumption (in calories) is imported in a 
normal year. 20 to 25% relates to grain in a drought year. However, if food 
production continues to rise 2% a year and population by over 3%, then by 
2000 food imports needed to avoid further deterioration in nutritional 
standards could be 15 to 20% of normal (20 to 30% of drought) year totals - a 
trebling which cannot reasonably be foreseen as providable by food aid and/or 
out of earned import capacity (exports).
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The present problem is most dramatic in cities because rural households seek 
(not always successfully) to keep household provisioning requirements out of 
normal year production; because in drought years surplus in most rural areas 
is very low and - as noted earlier - because the rise in the urban proportion 
of population has far outstripped rises in food producer productivity. It is 
not transitory but on a rising trend with normal weather years now producing 
alleviation but not fully adequate domestic urban supplies in most countries 
(e.g. Ghana, Nigeria, Cote d'Ivoire), surpluses in only a few (e.g. Tanzania, 
Kenya and - abstracting from refugees - Malawi), while regular surpluses 
across the weather cycle are very rare indeed (e.g. Zimbabwe).
Why? What Went Wrong?
It is necessary to consider what went wrong not so much for the purpose of 
attributing blame as to learn how to avoid repeating errors and to identify 
them, when made, in time to make corrections before costs of doing so (or of 
continuing not to do so) escalate. As Rector Rui Baltazaar of Eduardo 
Mondlane University put it "We must look our mistakes squarely in the face to 
avoid falling into repeating them".
First, African governments made policy and project errors and were slow to 
identify or to draw back from them. That these were often on foreign advice 
(often from the same institutions which now criticise them) does not make the 
African government's judgement correct nor does it shift the cost off 
Africas. Much of the problem has been bad data, bad analysis and worse 
monitoring.
Second, in at least some African states corruption, concentration on the 
interests of small elites and not unrelated escalation of military-police and 
administration budgets have been objectively inefficient either for national 
economic growth, for empowering poor people to income less poor or for 
extending access to basic services. More generally the reduction of absolute 
poverty has been a clear priority in a minority of countries and an explicit 
goal integrated technically and operationally into central social and 
economic policy almost nowhere. Further, what poverty focussed expenditure 
there has been has too often centred on subsidies (often not very efficient 
ones in share of benefit going to poor people) and to minimum wages with 
little real emphasis on production by poor people.
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Third, the external economic environment of the 1980's was miscalculated (by 
SSA in company with almost all international and Northern forecasters). This 
led to investments which in the new context did not pay off even if they 
would have in the old and in ways of providing government services and of 
importing/producer consumer goods which government revenue and national 
import capacity could no longer sustain. More serious, most states which had 
successfully adjusted to 1973~75 shocks and resumed rapid growth over 1976-79 
(a majority) not only sought to replicate their 1973~75 response in 1979-80 
but either persisted in it or descended into febrile crisis containment well 
into the 1980's when it should have been clear a new strategic approach was 
essential to curb decline, let alone create a basis for recovery and new, 
transformed development.
Fourth, overall the 1980's have been marked by more severe, wider spread and 
lengthier droughts than the 1960's or 1970's. Especially in Southern Africa 
and the Horn the intensity of war has increased with major negative social 
and economic costs far beyond direct military expenditures and battle 
casualties.
The basic causes of the sudden nosedive in most SSA economies after 1979 are 
fairly clearly external. Nothing else can explain why SSA wide and most 
country indicators turned down at the same time with little or no correlation 
to overall economic or social policy. But that does not say that SSA can 
expect exogenous changes to put matters right. First, neither the terms of 
trade nor the rate of growth of trade in commodities is likely to improve in 
the 1990's. Second, a decade (or longer) of problem overload and crisis 
management has shaken morale and self confidence of managers who had been 
able to cope with the less stringent demands of the 1970's. Until that is 
made good, coherent articulation and competent implementation of any strategy 
or policy will remain problematic. Third, the trying conditions of the 
1980's pinpointed weaknesses which had been bearable in easier times. 
Failure to address worryingly low growth of food production and failure to 
see that self reliance and economic transformation required more exports (to 
limit debt and donor dependence) are two examples. The droughts, wars and 
lower import capacity triggered the slow food production growth time bomb and 
the end of commercial and stagnation of real concessional finance interacted 
with the weakening export base to create import strangulation in many 
economies. Fourth, the interaction of population growth and ecological 
degradation reached a perceived crisis point in several states in the 1980's
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perhaps because the cumulative impact passed a tipping point, perhaps because 
of its interaction with enhanced drought, perhaps because it was more clearly 
seen (or a bit of each). There is no going back to I960 or 197^ or 1979-
The initial reaction of most SSA governments when it became clear 1981 and 
after would not resemble 1975 and after in the global economy or domestic 
resource availability was to seek to implement "belt tightening" and 
"austerity" programmes of varying levels of coherence and credibility. These 
stop gaps led to a variety of domestic or externally guided stabilisation and 
recovery programmes (of which in a sense the 1985/6 African Priority 
Programme for Economic Recovery was the clearest and last continental 
manifestation). Few were successful even at halting decline more than 
transitorily.
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Thus over the 1980’s more and more SSA states have opted - with varying 
degrees of belief - for International Monetary Fund/World Bank modelled 
and/or endorsed Stabilisation and Structural Adjustment Programmes. Some 
followed on failed national attempts on not totally dissimilar lines (e.g. 
Tanzania) and others on overall economic policy gaps of up to a decades' 
duration (e.g. Ghana).
Stabilisation, Structural Adjustment and All What?
The 1980's in SSA have been marked by a rapid cyclical rise in Stabilisation 
Programmes, usually under IMF tutelage, and Structural Adjustment Programmes, 
slightly less uniformly under Bank guidance. By 1989 about 30 SSA countries 
had some variant of internationally recognised SA programme plus 2 to 4 "do 
it yourself" variants and over I98O -89 a few more had been in and out one or 
more times. The dialogue and debate (not to say slanging match) on 
Stabilisation/Adjustment has been intense and sustained. Reasonably so since 
a combined sequence requires major socio-political as well as political 
economic changes and is likely to last a decade. Unfortunately much of the 
debate has been so polemic as to shed more heat than light and to spread more 
smoke than focussed illumination. Several points need to be made.
First, massive imbalances in macro and sectoral economic aggregates are not 
sustainable. This is no less time of nutrition, of basic health services and 
of poor peoples' livelihoods than of trade accounts and government budgets. 
In the 1980's in SSA many imbalances have been or become so extreme as to be 
unsustainable and quick turnaround efforts have (unlike the 197^“ 75 period) 
had few successes.
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Second, the basic choice is between planned and unplanned adjustment e.g. 
Ghana was adjusted over 1973_198l under regimes with no coherent economic 
policy just as much as (indeed more than) Botswana in 1982 under a quick 
response, overall, self run stabilisation exercise.
Third, there are major contradictions between the macro, monetary, short 
turn, demand management (cutting) stabilisation model of the Fund and the 
macro and sectoral, real, medium term, supply expansion structural adjustment 
model of the Bank and muddling the two into one (or describing the Fund's 
programme and calling it the Bank's strategy) is distinctly unlikely to lead 
to reasoned discourse or policy and praxis improvement.
Fourth, because Fund/Bank approved programmes do in fact secure more external 
resource support, a purely national adjustment is likely to require harsher 
initial demand cuts and to place more severe limits on a rapid sustained 
restoration of growth (e.g. Zimbabwe, Algeria).
Fifth, the makeup of resource alleviation and the policy priorities in a 
stabilisation/adjustment programme will determine who is empowered to produce 
what, for how much reward and which services are available to whom, how and 
where. Within fairly wide limits these sub-macro decisions will determine 
the positive or negative impact of a structural adjustment exercise on 
particular groups of absolutely poor people, on children and on vulnerable 
groups in real danger of being plunged into absolute poverty. (A 
stabilisation programme's short term impact is likely to be negative in 
respect to most poor people's real household income and access to basic 
services levels.)
Sixth, the record of structural adjustment programmes varies widely. On 
average it is problematic and clearly below and slower than expectations and 
needs.
The basic debate on Structural Adjustment (beyond that portion which is cross 
monologues of the deaf) has several facets. The simplest turns on tidying up 
on the basis of experiences and ensuring that real resource availability 
recovery comes sooner - a field in which the Bank, at least nominally the 
Fund, critics and African governments can and should find much useful common 
ground.
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The role of industry and of different types of exports (beyond or instead of 
traditional primary products) debates are partly of priority and sequence but 
partly of developmental vision over a 10 or 20 year perspective (beyond 
structural adjustment at least as usually perceived). So too is the role of 
economic regionalism. The Bank, critics and African governments have begun 
dialogues in these areas in which it would appear there is some hope of 
emergence of contextual syntheses.
The appropriate degree of state intervention, state ownership of productive 
enterprises, scope of state services, and user changes are issues on which 
there are both ideological and practical differences. The Bank believes 
greater acceptance of market forces is desirable in principle and that most 
African state interventions have been either counterproductive or served only 
small elite groups. It is opposed in principle to state ownership of 
directly productive enterprises, albeit relatively pragmatic in respect to 
reform (or joint venturisation) of successful, unsaleable or strategic ones 
if it believes the state is capable of devising and acting on a reform 
programme. The Bank does not in fact believe most SSA states go beyond its 
idea of how much in the way of public services should be provided. Its 
argument is that using too many people to pay properly, with too few 
supporting resources on too many services, some of which are not effective, 
results in less actually being done than were there a contraction in size and 
scope using rather more resources to have a real impact on a limited range of 
services which are efficient for reaching specified goals. The Bank believes 
(has believed for at least two decades) user charges are a good thing and is 
ideologically unwilling to accept that, in SSA, access, administration and 
collection problems make them at best a marginal tool for efficiency, but a 
potentially lethal one against poor people.
There is evidence that SSA governments have intervened counterproductivity 
with ill chosen instruments, have spread themselves too thin and own more 
enterprises than they can monitor or manage (and often some rather unsuitable 
ones) . Few states or critics would deny this so that there is room for 
interim agreement, although on the role of the state there are some basic 
disagreements. On fees because the Bank's position is ultimately ideological 
there are more contradictions, albeit it must be said many SSA governments 
and critics have been slow to see even the functional problems and have 
attempted or adopted some unwise fee positions and structures in haste which 
at least a number (e.g. Mozambique in the health field) are already 
regretting at leisure.
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There is a somewhat different dialogue on the international context. The 
Bank does not oppose (but advocates and has worked for) more soft resource 
transfers, larger debt writeoffs, less industrial economy protectionism and 
better commodity terms of trade. But - realistically - it declines to 
project these will be achieved let alone build programmes on that assumption 
until they are actually in hand. This may make its advocacy less effective 
but for it - as for an SSA government - to plan on the basis of a desired or 
a more just external economic context until it happens is a recipe for 
disaster.
Structural Adjustment and Poor People
Poor people in SSA are in the vast majority of cases becoming poorer. This 
process began before structural adjustment programmes but has not been 
reversed in most of them. This is especially true on the basic service 
access side where budget balancing and debt service funding have led to real 
expenditure cuts in the early years of most programmes (not all e.g. 
Mozambique, Tanzania and among nationally designed ones Zimbabwe). In 
respect to poor peoples incomes while some have benefited, some been hampered 
and the balance is unclear except where significant (over 4% a year) growth 
has been regained and held in which cases on balance most, but not all, poor 
people's real household incomes have risen. In general it is easy to 
demonstrate certain groups of absolutely poor people have usually fared ill 
under structural adjustment (especially urban workers and some informal sub­
sectors) and some vulnerable groups have been pushed into absolute poverty 
(e.g. fired - "redeployed" in the Bank's rather cynical terminology - 
workers) and that (at least until 1985) basic services fared ill in budget 
adjustments. It is harder to argue that continuation of pre-adjustment 
trends would have been good for poor people or even less bad than the actual 
outturn.
For that reason three points deserve central attention:
First, if expowering poor people to produce more and to have access to basic 
services is central to development then a basic test of any structural 
adjustment programme is whether (and how) it targets, allocates resources to 
and furthers that end in practice. That "things would have been worse 
otherwise" is by no means an adequate defense.
21
Second, Structural Dimensions of Adjustment approaches and even analyses like 
Adjustment With A Human Face are too narrow in concentrating on those 
absolutely poor people and/or less poor vulnerable group members directly 
adversely affected by structural adjustment programmes. It is not enough to 
mitigate damage and indeed these groups may either not be operational 
categories for programming or many not be those most in need of assistance in 
rehabilitating their livelihoods or gaining access to services. In fairness, 
both the Bank's SDA unit and the largest Programme to Mitigate the Social 
Costs of Adjustment (Ghana) implicitly accept this point in part and do focus 
on programmes targeted against absolute poverty and for basic service 
restoration more broadly.
Third, therefore to be acceptable any structural adjustment programme should 
have priority targets (backed by resource allocations and policies) relevant 
to reducing absolute poverty e.g. access to basic services, minimum wage, 
small (and especially small female) farmer oriented extension and input 
programmes, adoption of labour intensive techniques. Further these should be 
integrated into the core strategy and operated within all sectors and most 
programmes not treated as (usually optional or dispensable) add ons if 
additional finance beyond the core becomes available.
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Killing The Elephant: Prospectives On Retrieving The Future
To assert that the present contextual and processual starting point in most 
SSA countries is broadly positive is misguided optimism. The one region to 
most of whose countries that may apply is Southern Africa on the condition 
that peace is about to break out - not yet a safe assumption. The passenger 
who asked at Kampala how to go by train to Dar es Salaam was told that the 
station attendant wouldn't start from Kampala and especially not that day of 
the week. Like him Africans do not have the luxury of choosing their starting 
point - it has to be here in Africa and now in late 1989. The appropriate 
attitude is (with apologies to wildlife conservationists!) perhaps that of the 
Tanzanian lake district proverb:
Rabbit where are you going?
I am going out to kill the elephant.
Can your really do that?
Well, I’ll try and try again.
Nor is survival enough. The UNICEF poster of the young girl answering "What 
do you want to be when you grow up?" by saying "Alive" has its priorities in 
the right sequence. For the dead there is no future. Survival matters. But 
it is not enough. The continuing struggle is for fuller and more human lives
- for UNICEF with a particular focus on children and women - not for bare 
physical survival.
Macroeconomic Necessities
SSA economies need to grow 5% a year in the 1990s (versus an average of barely 
2% in the 1980s) and within that total food production needs to grow 4$ 
(against a 1965-1985 trend of about 2%). On the one hand that is a modest 
goal - it will still leave 1990 per capita output at or below 1970 levels 
overall. But, as the bracketed figures indicate, it is also an ambitious 
target though one achieved on the overall output side by a majority of states 
in the 1960s and late 1970s and almost reached by a few on the food production 
side for most (but not all) years.
III.
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Without that pattern of growth the base for human investment/basic services, 
empowering poor people to produce more (eradicating absolute poverty by - say
- 2010) and financing needed fixed investment simply will not be available. 
Like law and order, significant output growth per person is not everything but 
without it there will be little else.
To achieve those growth rates SSA will need to be able to import 4 to 6? more 
per year even with import substitution in food and basic manufactures. For a 
majority of countries that growth cannot be financed by 4 to 6? export growth 
(a highest plausible average) so that external financial transfers must rise. 
Even in relatively well financed, tightly run recovery and transformation 
programmes like those of Mozambique, Ghana and Tanzania import capacity 
constraints remain severe and in any case 5 to 6? annual resource flow 
increases are needed. Assuming increased debt writeoff or deferral sine die 
(which appears to be the trend) overall gross resource transfers to SSA will 
need to double by 2000 to sustain the growth process posited. This is not 
desirable and may not be feasible but the survival of recovery and 
transformation depends on the import growth cited and 10? + export growth to 
finance it autonomously is quite impossible for more than a handful of 
countries before 1990 even with export diversification and rapid buildup of 
intra-African trade.
Fiscally the overall requirement is for recurrent budgets (excluding interest) 
of 15 to 18? of GDP albeit for very poor countries this may be too low. Of 
that about one-third is needed for basic human investment/social services, 
one-third plus for economic and infrastructural services and one-third minus 
(a ceiling) for administration, security, defence and general services 
(including pensions and consumer subsidies). A majority of SSA economies can 
finance such levels domestically by 2000 but whether they can also cover 5? of 
GDP for interest payments is much less clear so that external recurrent budget 
support will continue to be needed.
Gross investment levels of 20-25? of GDP (one-half more than typical today) 
will be needed to sustain this macroeconomic scenario. (The net level implied 
is 10 to 15?). Given the external balance gap posited, this requires domestic 
savings of 10 to 15? of GDP (by no means generally unattainable) with the 
balance grant or concessional transfers.
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The two highly problematic variables in this scenario are import capacity and 
a fortiori food production. Most SSA economies have demonstrated a capacity 
to grow 5$ and - in that case - to raise recurrent revenue to at least 15$ of 
GDP and savings to 10$. But, as noted, the import capacity condition implies 
both export increases of over 5$ annually (not achieved on a sustained basis 
at any time since the 1960s by more than a minority of SSA states) and rapid 
increases in real resource inflows. Further, both requirements are in real 
(export or transfer sums divided by the import price index) terms so are 
sensitive to terms of trade declines or rapid global inflation.
Food growth at 4$ a year cannot be achieved by switching away from industrial 
and export crops. Even if these were static, redistributing present 
agricultural growth entirely to food would only yield about a 2.5$ annual 
rate. Further, without at least 4$ growth in the agricultural subsectors 
other than domestic food production neither industrial nor export growth 
requirements can be met.
Food output growth is a necessary condition for national food security in all 
but a handful of export rich states (e.g. Botswana) as well as for household 
food security for poor peasant households (over 50$ of all households on an 
SSA wide basis including those 10$ to 25$ above the absolute poverty line). 
How to achieve it is much harder to posit.
In the short run improved simple input and access to transport requirements 
backed by accessible markets (to buy as well as to sell), reasonable prices 
(e.g. market set with an effective floor price for grains) and broadening use 
of best known peasant techniques (including involving peasants who now use 
them as part-time popularisers and demonstrators) might bring the growth rate 
up to 4$ for several years - especially where (e.g. in Tanzania) medium 
quality land remains available and the trend food production growth rate has 
been at or over 3$ for almost three decades or (e.g. Mozambique) war 
devastated security may be at least partially restored.
In the medium term cost effective, user friendly technical improvements will 
be essential. These are not available "off the shelf" in more than a few 
cases so that sharp improvement in efficiency of research (and less generally 
of resources devoted to it) is needed beginning now if higher growth rates are
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to be sustainable. In parallel extension services need to be raised in 
quality and ability to teach. (In many countries especially in Western and 
Central Africa and the Horn more are needed but not more of the same.)
Issues relating to the invisibility of women and women's economic 
opportunities/work overload discussed below are particularly relevant to this 
sector.
Empowering Poor People
Macroeconomic balance and sustained growth is necessary to enabling poor 
households to claw their way out of absolute poverty. It is not enough to 
achieve that end.
Four more components are needed: enabling poor people to produce more; 
providing broader (toward universal) access to basic services; 
allowing/encouraging participation and self-organisation by poor people and 
creating structures of accountability (for private as well as public sector 
officials, managers and decision takers).
The first element is essential. Unless it is central to economic policy (not 
an afterthought with paste on special projects) poor households will not be 
able to generate adequate incomes (in kind and cash) to escape from absolute 
poverty.
The three areas in which increased production by poor people is needed are 
small scale agriculture, small ("informal") non-agricultural activities and 
wage employment (formal and informal). The common feature is that in each 
area specific gains can be won but only if identifying targets, ways and means 
and specific resource requirements is integral to the overall economic policy 
decision-making and implementation process, not a side show.
In general there is no reason to suppose such reorientation would reduce 
growth and in many cases it would increase it as well as making it less import 
intensive. But it would require very substantial reorganisation of overall as 
well as specific conceptualisation and organisation. For example, wage 
employment can be expanded rapidly if more labour intensive ways of
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effectuating priority targets - e.g. in road and building, maintenance, rural 
construction, housing - are identified and adapted. To do so needs different 
technology, new training of managers and workers, organising rural projects 
seasonally (and having a "desired project bank" for use in drought years), 
creating an environment (incentives, inputs, tools, credit) in which 
artisan-led "informal" construction teams can flourish.
Basic services (health, education, pure water, extension) currently have a 
less peripheral role in economic decision-taking because "human investment" is 
a recognised category. But not all human investment is directly relevant to 
poor people and both the theory and practice often concentrate on the other 
end of the spectrum (e.g. universities and consultancy hospitals) creating an 
imbalance in favour of the not so- or not poor.
Further, human investment traditionally has been narrowly defined. Reducing 
women's workload by reducing the time needed to tend the sick and take them to 
health posts or to collect water has not usually been taken into account any 
more than the truism that uneducated, malnourished, often ill people cannot 
work very long, hard or productively.
Participation is needed at several levels for interacting reasons. First, 
poor people know better what they want/need than outsiders (even though the 
poor people do not know fully or perfectly and the outsiders have their uses). 
Second, the vital resource needed to reduce absolute poverty is the labour of 
poor people. Third, asking users (would-be beneficiaries) will often reduce 
or allow early correction of design and operation failures. Fourth, resources 
are scarce relative to demands on them so that unless they are participating 
in an organised way in lobbying and operating the decision-taking/resource 
allocating process poor people (and definable, operational sets of poor 
people) will continue to get crumbs not main courses from the table. All of 
these factors indicate the importance of self-organisation (from community to 
national level) of groups of poor people either by themselves or with not so 
poor people. Outsiders cannot in practice cause and sustain significant 
changes in resource allocation decisions except under very special 
circumstances unless they are closely linked to real domestic civil society 
forces concerned with achieving the same objectives. Noblesse oblige domestic
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concern plus external agencies is no substitute for participation increasingly 
grounded on self-organisation, least of all in contexts of severely 
constricted or contracting resources.
Accountability is necessary to ensure that what is supposed to be/agreed to be 
done actually is done with acceptable levels of timeliness, completeness and 
competence. (One of four clinics, three years late with next to no drugs is 
an example of failing all three tests.) Ultimately accountability requires 
that errors be set right by reform or removal, by election or ombudsperson, by 
legal processes or by public disapprobation. It is the effective process and 
practice of calling to account which is needed not any particular route to or 
form of achieving it.
From SSA To Operational Levels
The difficulty with concise SSA summaries is that they oversimplify reality 
and, for most particular countries or areas (geographic or social) within 
countries, at least somewhat distort it. With broad scenario target or ways 
and means formulations they can be - at best - guidelines from which 
contextual (time, place, person) policies and practices can be constructed.
Certain differences - urban/rural, intro urban, intra rural, gender - are 
widely recognised albeit not always well delineated (e.g. in most of SSA so 
far as effective consuming power is concerned 50? or more of the urban 
population is as poor as all but the poorest rural households and is probably 
more subject to malnutrition). These affect planning, targetting and acting 
within a country.
At one level intra country differences are even better known. The resource 
availability parameters (in general and for basic services in particular) of 
Botswana, Zimbabwe, Tanzania, Mozambique and Somalia are certainly known to be 
totally different and in certain ways this is taken into account in 
conceptualising what is possible and targetable.
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But there is a danger of reductionism in such exercises. Additional clear 
contrasts exist:
a. state of peace or war and nature of war?
b. strength of civil society and relation with (or alienation from) 
government?
c. demonstrated priority (or otherwise) given to - e.g. - health care and 
within it to primary health care?
d. general and specific institutional and personnel capabilities?
On pure financial resource criteria and war/peace criteria Mozambique might be 
supposed to resemble Somalia in terms of what is possible. This is not so. 
In Mozambique primary health care has always been a government priority and 
civil society expects it to be provided - in Somalia the reverse is true on 
both counts. In Mozambique the government health service is a functioning 
group of organisations with clear purposes, moderate morale and a not 
inconsiderable capacity to cope - not so in Somalia outside a few urban 
hospitals. In rural Somalia many rural communities (defined as people rather 
than places) are - or at least were up to 1988 - well organised with capacity 
to provide and to finance partially new services (e.g. external 
organisation/primary health care networks) but in rural Mozambique many rural 
communities are so shaken by war and consequential dislocation as to limit 
their ability to cope beyond immediate household livelihood rehabilitation 
needs and most of the others are too poor to make significant financial 
contributions (or even in many cases labour time ones until familial sector 
production is restored).
Thus entirely different models of interaction among communities, government 
and external agencies are needed in respect to primary health care extension 
in Somalia and Mozambique. In practice this does take place but almost 
intuitively so that, e.g., rather foredoomed efforts to use government 
channels in Somalia and, e.g., failure (including until recently by the 
Ministry of Health) to identify finance for previously community supported 
basic health workers/animators in Mozambique as a priority input to
rehabilitating community participation are frequent even by relatively 
socially sensitive actors like UNICEF.
A more mundane example is the difference in appropriate ways (for external 
agencies or communities) of relating to centralised, partially decentralised 
and basically decentralised systems and with transitions from one to another. 
In general the decentralised are most accessible to communities but least 
convenient for national civil society groups or external actors with limited 
personnel. Specific means of coping are rarely both evident and operationally 
satisfactory (vide UNICEF's reflection process in Ghana).
Failure to examine these social - institutional - civil/governmental dynamics 
differences with a view to their impact on instrument selection leads to, at 
best, overgeneralised prescriptions. These are not all as blatant as the 
ideological vendetta against taxpayer (and donor) financed primary health care 
waged over the 1980s by many World Bank officials and consultants. A much 
more subtle example is the Bamako Initiative or at least the frequently 
reductionist ways suggested for implementing it.
Community participation in health and health care is not at issue. Nor is the 
need to mobilise more resources for health services including rechannelling 
some going inefficiently (from the payer and social viewpoints) into private 
practice (modern and/or traditional). But:
a. community structures and openness to poor households vary widely - with 
clear implications for how committed to ensuring access to health 
services on the basis of need they are likely to be;
b. community resources (financial, administrative, labour time, food, 
materials) vary tremendously (even within a district let alone a country 
or SSA) - with evident resultant divergences in levels and makeup of 
possible input;
c. cash payments may be much harder to raise than payments in food (for 
staff) in materials (for buildings) or labour (for building maintenance 
or construction or on health workers’ family food plots) and direct tying 
of contributions to individual health service use may be inferior to
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annual phased contributions (a form of insurance) or to communally raised 
ones (which can be progressive as to incidence);
d. the outlooks of the community contribution supporters range from 
ideological opponents of full social financing of social services through 
pragmatic overuse minimisers/resource availability maximisers to radical 
opponents of government involvement in community affairs. While the 
first and last group (for very different reasons) want to "let government 
off the hook" on its duty to provide universal access basic health care 
and education the middle one (e.g. UNICEF) most certainly does not.
Seeking a crudely reductionist of Bamako to centrally set fees for specific 
uses (e.g. drug costs) and to pay these cash flows from the community to the 
centre and to enforce that model generally is, at best, an absurdity. It may 
be necessary and workable on occasion (e.g. Somalia, Benin) but in other cases 
(e.g. Mozambique, Tanzania) it would set back primary health care development 
even though more flexible, decentralised community chosen means of involvement 
and support could be devised, accepted and implemented.
A Bouquet of Sectoral/Sectional/Special Topics
Macro issues matter. If macro balances are unmanageable imbalances and 
overall trends point the wrong way, no amount of sectoral project and special 
programme soundness can do more than limit deterioration, share losses less 
inequitably and help absolutely poor people survive (or more accurately reduce 
the number who fail to survive). However, macro policies in general can help 
enable but not cause and without special topic/sectional/sectoral articulation 
and implementation can neither have an absolute poverty reduction (or any 
other distributional) strategic thrust nor be efficient in achieving desired 
macro targets and trends.
Six topics are sketched here. Doubtless at least six more could be 
prioritised and perhaps one or two arguably could be downgraded. However, all 
included are important generally and in their implications for the well-being 
of mothers and children (especially poor mothers and children) and appear to 
be on or close enough to decision-takers agendas to repay policy focussed
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attention now. They include: community participation, population,
urbanisation, human resource development, women and household food security.
Community participation has in part been discussed under empowering poor 
people to produce more and to win more effective access to basic services. 
The pitfalls of rigid, centralised, extractive approaches to it have also been 
sketched in respect to some readings of the Bamako Initiative.
Community participation suffers from being defined in totally contradictory 
ways - usually implicitly - leading to excessively incoherent dialogue and 
inconsistent/unsuccessful implementation. If the argument is for
participation in production, poor people already do as far as they are able 
but at inadequate levels of productivity - empowerment by expanding 
employment, improving access to inputs and infrastructure, human resource 
development/basic service access are needed not rhetoric or coercion. (Price 
incentives may well be relevant if present price patterns run contrary to 
productive efficiency, but are perhaps best viewed as non-physical 
infrastructure.) If it is for acting to carry out government policies, there 
is little likelihood rhetoric or coercion are much more relevant albeit 
explication often is. Participation in design, discovering how the policy 
relates (or could relate) to community needs and empowerment are likely to be 
much more relevant priorities. If seen as a means to resource mobilisation, 
extracting the resources for central use (even if nominally in support of the 
community) then except under rather special circumstances the words have been 
turned on their heads. Poll taxes and drug charges may at times be necessary, 
the basic community may under some circumstances be the best collection 
device, but they are no more (or less) community participation than community 
members' payment of sales taxes embodied in the prices they pay at local 
shops.
Full community participation has to be grounded on some form of community 
self-organisation. How is a contextual issue: local party branches, local 
councils, autonomous community associations, savings and credit societies, 
women's co-ops, water supply management and maintenance committees are all 
appropriate for certain forms of participation in some contexts. This 
necessarily implies that its ends must be community chosen - which does not 
rule out external (local, national or external) advice, education, dialogue,
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cooperation. It does mean the community bodies must have social and political 
space to decide and to act in non-trivial ways.
Steps toward community participation can be based on officials of 
non-community bodies asking/listening/responding without a clear community 
organisation base, but that process will normally lead either to quasi-formal 
community organisation or to a low level plateau.
Population is an emotive topic, but too serious to be passed by in silence. 
Rapid population growth raises demand on resources more than it raises supply. 
Large numbers of children (especially in female-headed households) are 
causally associated with poverty (in both directions, i.e. large households 
lead to poverty and vice versa). Frequent, closely spaced pregnancies have 
negative impacts on maternal and child health and on female income 
earning/food raising. These are simple facts. The bucolic vision of a mouth 
coming with a pair of hands appended has some relevance to low intensity, open 
land frontier agriculture in a largely self-provisioning household based 
economic system subject to high infant and child mortality and old age 
security dependent on surviving children. (Even then, child spacing would 
probably be more 'efficient' than a rapid succession of pregnancies and was, 
in fact, widely practiced in many pre-colonial African societies.) It poses 
very serious problems even at household level in much more cash oriented, 
relative land scarcity rural or in urban contexts.
Lower population growth rates are demonstrably desirable as is child spacing 
(whatever the "completed family" size). The problem is creating contexts and 
designing policies which empower people to act in ways leading to that result. 
In general head-on population growth reduction policies seem to be a rather 
small part of the answer. True, education and dialogue are needed to overcome 
religious, traditional social and male chauvinist (or traditional female role 
linked natalist views. True too, access to family spacing/planning advice is 
needed if technical knowledge and/or material inputs are lacking and demand 
for them exists and is rising. But five measures are - logically and 
historically - likely to be more crucial:
reducing infant and under five mortality in order to reduce the births 
needed for any desired family size and reduce the 'overshoot' caused by 
risk avoidance;
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2. moving to universal primary and adult education (especially but not only 
for women) to increase options open to and knowledge controlled by women 
and to increase the expense of bringing up children;
3. increasing women's economic opportunities (urban and rural, employment 
and self-employment) for much the same reasons;
4. increasing levels of nutrition and of catastrophe mitigating food supply
- perhaps primarily because of impact on IU5M mortality but also because 
this seems to reduce the perceived security need for children;
5. broadening alternative routes to old age security to reduce the need to 
have many living children so that at least one has done well enough to be 
able to support his aged relatives.
Child spacing - in contrast to direct total birth reduction calls - does 
relate directly to the first and reinforces the second and third of these 
points. Equally it has deep (if somewhat withered) roots in most African 
cultures so is less likely to arouse vehement ideological hostility.
Urbanisation in SSA is inevitable and (given constraints on land and 
technology availability) desirable process in Africa. The true policy 
problems relate to pace and cost.
Urban bias in access to basic services and - where it remains - in access to 
above absolute poverty cash and kind incomes create excess and excessively 
rapid urbanisation. The answer to the first is fairly evident; the second 
includes facilitating rural-rural migration (larger than rural-urban in many 
SSA countries) from relatively overpopulated to relatively underpopulated 
areas (e.g. from the Owerri Plateau to the Middle Belt in Nigeria or from 
Kilimanjaro-Meru to Southern and Southwestern Tanzania).
Urban overhead costs: notably water, sanitation, roads, transport, housing, 
policing - are higher in real resource terms per household for equal benefit 
per household in urban than in rural areas. Unless the faces of the poor are 
to be, almost literally, ground into the dust or mud much of the 'excess' cost 
will have to be met socially. The problems are designing ways to achieve
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actual access for poor people (so that they are not shoved into absolute 
poverty) while holding resource and technical/managerial demands to affordable 
levels. Both private sector participation (e.g. contexts favourable to 
artisan-led informal building teams dealing with would-be owners) and 
community participation (e.g. neighbourhood supported pure water projects or 
project segments replacing polluted water and/or expensive private water 
carrier services) do have roles to play, but a socially defined strategy and 
context are needed for them to do so in ways beneficial to poor households.
Women's economic activity options in urban areas need priority attention. 
Certainly urban SSA women are much more economically active in 1989 than 1969 
(especially in Eastern Africa, the Horn and parts of Southern and Central 
Africa) but dominantly in low productivity residual sectors such as very petty 
trade and as an enforced survival strategy. Unlike women's role in 
agriculture, this problem (and its interaction with reducing other parts of 
urban women's workload) is not at all well researched on any articulated basis 
and is - with few exceptions - still remote from actual decision-takers' 
agendas.
Urbanisation requires increases in production per peasant household. This is 
easily illustrated numerically. If 90$ of all households grow food and 10$ do 
not then on average each food growing household must produce 111$ of its own 
needs. If the percentages change to 60$ and 40$ that average ratio rises to 
167$ implying a required average food producing unit production growth of 
about 50$. Failure to achieve that kind of growth is the prime reason for 
SSA's food crisis and import increases and why outside drought disaster years' 
food crises - and/or food import use is rather more an urban than a rural 
problem.
Human Resource Development as it relates to access to basic services in the 
context of empowering poor people to escape from absolute poverty has been 
sketched above. In that context prioritisation and sequencing are of major 
and often unrecognised importance.
A concrete example illustrates this problem clearly. if primary education 
enrollment is below - say - 90$ (80$ for girls) and adult literacy below 75$ 
(60$ for women) while continuing (vocational/practical skills) adult education 
and extension are weak is universal access, formal pre-primary education an
immediate priority? (Indeed is it even conceivably feasible?) If only a 
small largely urban formal pre-primary sector is possible, should it be public 
or - since in fact places will go overwhelmingly to children of not poor 
families - private? Can enhancing women's economic options, child 
socialisation and pre-primary familiarisation with the language of instruction 
be furthered by community (neighbourhood) financeable day care centres? If 
so, what supervision, teacher training and specific material resource inputs 
from the government or donors are necessary/desirable/achievable?
But human resource development is not - and should not be - focussed purely on 
basic services. A functioning health system needs consultancy and training 
hospitals and an education system empowering an economy to meet macro and 
poverty reduction targets needs secondary, specialised professional and 
tertiary level institutions. The real issues are ones of interaction and 
balance and tend to be quite country specific, e.g. present 'excess' levels of 
university graduates in some countries and subjects.
At both the basic service and the higher levels, user charges tend to be an 
issue which results in misallocation of scarce resources (research, managerial 
and administrative and decision-taker). In countries as poor as all but a few 
in SSA, half of users can afford to pay negligible amounts and all but perhaps 
10? can pay much less than full cost (and with a cost cap). Simple schemes 
(with waiver provisions and exemptions for certain services as well as total 
charge caps and blanket exclusion of poverty groups) like Zimbabwe's or those 
of the Ghana Christian Health Association can yield modest revenue with no 
major damage to access by poor people. More complex and broadly based ones -
e.g. Mozambique - tend to yield negligible funds at massive costs in relation 
to exclusion and also administration, collection, and
decision-taking/reviewing time. Full costing or anything like it for 
universities (or non-boarding secondary schools) is practicable without 
excluding 90? of the relevant age group whatever its other qualifications 
(which is nonsense in economic efficiency terms) only if it is financed by 
employers (present or prospective) or loans. The former is a promising but 
limited route; the latter (judging by industrial economy experience and 
typical African graduate incomes) would yield significant revenues, at best, 
after a significant lag and would suffer from high location/collection 
expenses and low collection rates. One is forced to wonder whether the game
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is worth the candle and, given the social tensions caused, whether it even can 
be a positive sum game.
Women are not a problem or an issue. Rather women have problems which raise 
issues as to how they can be empowered to reduce/overcome them which are of 
human, household and macroeconomic priority. The central problems are total 
work overload (uniformly in rural areas and generally - if not universally - 
for poor urban women), access to productive income (including household 
provisioning) opportunities and to basic services and full participation in 
civil society. These problems are inter-related but the most basic is often 
that of total workload. If wooding (fuelling), watering, cooking, cleansing, 
household chores and caring for the sick take up 10 to 12 hours a day (not 
uncommon) then time available for earning or producing household income is 
very limited and that for utilising adult education opportunities and/or 
participating in civil society beyond the household is still more limited (to 
the point of non-existence for many poor women according to their own accounts 
and to common sense). Per contra limited participation in civil society often 
precludes fully effective or secure access to land, to credit, to control over 
labour time and to securing priority attention to reducing women's overall 
workload, to ensuring that employment generation strategy includes women, to 
redesigning extension services to take account of gender divisions (and 
interactions) of labour and to speeding the reduction of a bias in results 
against women in most levels of educational enrollment in most SSA countries.
Two points in respect to workload require articulated attention to identify 
promising ways forward. First, recognition that time is fungible so that 
provision of nearby pure water, reduction of illnesses to be tended (e.g. by 
vaccination, oral rehydration) and by introduction of affordable time saving 
food processing techniques are relevant to increasing income earning/household 
provisioning activity and effective access to, e.g. adult education, women's 
cooperatives, civil society groups; second, detailed articulated studies of 
workload patterns and known/affordable time saving innovations available.
The workload patterns and detailed gender divisions of labour and of income 
and expenditure (especially but not only in agriculture) are urgently needed. 
Not all women's agricultural wore is on products they use to feed their 
households or to sell. Some "male produce" is processed and sold by women 
who keep the proceeds for their budgets. African household budgets (like
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labour time) have gender divisions by type of expenditure (and like labour 
time they vary from area to area and shift over time).
There is also a danger of confusing appearance with reality. For example, 
whether women (especially those who are de facto or de jure heads of 
household) have secure access to land cannot be determined by looking at 
whether formal land tenure allocations are to them. In some traditional 
systems, the obligation to provide wives, widows, unmarried sisters and even 
more distant relatives with land rests on male relatives whose land 
allocations are partly determined by the extent of such obligations and who 
normally honour them. Per contra formal allocation of user rights or even 
legal title to land to women may mask a reality of male control over female 
labour time, allocation of the land by crop and male 'acquisition' of most of 
the output. The former system is doubtless patriarchal but can provide secure 
access; the latter is probably no less patriarchal in substance and clearly 
provides less security.
Household food security turns on entitlements (i.e. production, income to 
purchase or emergency food provision systems whether direct or via employment 
creation). National food security (physical availability of food) is a 
necessary condition for overall household food security but, for two reasons, 
not a sufficient one. First household food security requires physically 
accessible food not just supplies in a far off port or inaccessible farming 
area. Second, physical availability does not nourish those without 
entitlements in cash or to own production.
Routes to answering the first additional condition turn on improvements in 
domestic information flows, marketing institutions (public or private) and 
transportation. They are usually by no means trivial to enhancing food 
security - unsaleable or unmoveable surpluses rotting in isolated areas or 
port godowns while acute physical food shortages exist elsewhere even for 
persons who could afford to pay for food if a functioning national market 
using all available supplies existed are endemic.
However, the increased access to the entitlements issue is the more general 
one in most of SSA. As the majority of malnourished households are poor the 
'obvious' answer "produce more" is relevant. However, at household level 
whether this should be more food to eat, more crops (food or non-food) to sell
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to buy food or more non-agricultural income is an empirical question 
answerable in terms of what activity (or mix of activities) will in fact raise 
food entitlements most. For example, in Northern and Upper Ghana enhanced 
production of cotton and tobacco and a fairer price for women shea nut 
collectors are part of the answer to enhancing household food security through 
reducing pressures to sell food. That pressure is intense because some basic 
needs require cash and, at present, many households have no alternative way of 
acquiring it.
In urban areas more or more productive employment/self-employment is central 
to raising entitlements. This may involve such disparate elements as raising 
the real minimum wage, providing access to tools and raw materials for 
artisans and shifting street and building maintenance to labour intensive 
modes. In both urban and rural areas employment expansion - including but not 
limited to public sector social and economic infrastructure - targetted to be 
accessible and attractive to poor household members (including and with 
specific attention to actual employment of women) can play a useful supporting 
role.
That role may be most important in maintaining entitlements during climatic or 
economic crises. However, it is also relevant (at least on a seasonal basis) 
in poor rural areas and urban neighbourhoods. Further, cost efficiency and 
managerial capacity maintenance/development usually require a basic programme 
and a bank or shelf of desirable projects ready to be used to expand rapidly 
when needed not a stop/go approach repeatedly starting late with poor 
managerial capacity and distinctly sub-optimal project selection and 
execution.
Both because it generates output and because it maintains participant 
self-respect (and the viability of the commercial food distribution system), 
work for food approaches to providing entitlement safety nets are superior to 
free food distribution under most conditions with food for work approaches 
intermediate. But in severe famines or isolated areas (or when no work 
schemes can be put into effect promptly) limiting malnutrition and ensuring 
survival dictate free food distribution. Whether general use of targetted 
food supplementation supplies is nutritionally effective or practicable is 
highly contextually specific with a relatively depressing general picture 
outside health care programmes built around ante-natal and well child clinics
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and emergency entitlement preservation packages (e.g. Botswana). Food 
subsidies are inferior in most cases to income enhancement - combined if 
feasible with "fair price shops" which are cost covering and provide adequate 
incentives to acquire needed private sector participation (e.g. at retail 
level in the Maputo/Beira "abastacimento" ration system in Mozambique).
For households (or isolated individuals) who cannot earn nutritionally 
adequate entitlements because of age, infirmity, civil dislocation or war 
and/or very high dependency/worker ratios (poverty of labour power), direct 
income support whether in cash (which poses major problems in most SSA 
contexts but may not be as non-feasible as is usually supposed, e.g. it could 
be operated in Maputo) or in food is needed. The basic barriers to more 
effective action are identifying all (almost all) intended beneficiaries and 
excluding almost all not so poor or not poor benefit seekers and fiscal 
burden. (Physical inability to secure or move the food may or may not be 
another key obstacle in any specific case.) Innovative identification 
procedures involving community and decentralised government participation can 
sometimes reduce the first barrier to manageable proportions. The second is 
probably surmountable only if many households/isolated individuals without own 
entitlements can call on and receive extended family or broader social group 
support. That depends in large part as to whether safeguarding and raising 
food entitlement for other households is effective. For example, if a peasant 
household has been empowered to produce more food and to increase cash from 
sales of crops and from wage income it is much more likely to be able to 
honour its social obligation (which usually does exist) to provide food to 
related households whose food entitlements cannot cover nutritional needs. 
The less food deficit households there are, and the firmer the food security 
of the others, the more weight the extended family system and its agnates can 
bear in respect to structurally food insecure households and isolated 
individuals. For example, Mozambique's providing initial food, seeds and 
tools packages to households who provide new family context for orphaned 
children is grounded in part on this approach.
40
Toward Child Survival and Development
Up to this point the analysis and strategic guideline setting has ranged from 
macro through sectoral to gender and household levels with no direct reference 
to children. For this there are three basic reasons.
First, unless macro and sectoral directions of change are positive it is - at 
least in SSA - inconceivable that sustained progress can be made in ensuring 
child development, albeit in the short term low cost technical innovations 
(e.g. immunisation, oral rehydration, breast feeding and growth charts) can 
sustain or even improve survival levels. That is worth doing, but the ways to 
doing it are moderately clear and it is neither enough nor even sustainable 
unless broader contextual trends are altered.
Second, children are most unlikely to be radically better off than their 
households and, in particular, their mothers. Children in absolutely poor 
households are and will continue to be absolutely poor until the household is 
able to escape from absolute poverty. Outside intervention can improve 
survival - and perhaps adult welfare - chances. That is worth doing but 
cannot ensure well fed, well clad, well housed, school attending children in 
chronically malnourished, rag clad, shack dwelling households needing whatever 
pittance children can contribute to household survival.
Third, UNICEF's 1989 Strategies For Children In The 1990's and the pending 
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child set out in 1990s targets 
and overall normative and social goals with considerable clarity and 
articulation. Abbreviated summaries would serve only a limited purpose.
Targets: Global Thru' Provincial
The UNICEF global targets are a starting point. To be the basis for 
programming they need to be tested against country and provincial/district 
contexts and sub-targets set - preferably in a national dialogue involving 
civil society groups, government and external cooperating partners and 
endorsed by the government with as much formality and publicity as possible. 
The SSA regional targets are, in themselves, less important albeit they should 
be aggregated from the national ones and used as a basis for emulation.
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Because SSA is the region with the worst human conditions - especially in 
respect to infant mortality and morbidity - as well as the least resources per 
capita some of the global targets may not be feasible. An evident example is 
pure water for all (with consequential eradication of guinea worm) by 1995. 
In such cases a hard but attainable target is more useful than one certain to 
be missed. In other cases while possible targets will require special effort 
in SSA because the present is so far from the goal and/or progress is slow and 
erratic. Maternal tetanus vaccination is an example.
Certain targets need institutional forms directly linked to them. Ante 
natal/well child clinics are an example as are community health 
workers/demonstraters/animators selected by the village or neighbourhood. 
Where the communities cannot initially support them, securing interim outside 
funding is a priority.
In the case of IMR and U5MR rates the bases used should be current country 
estimates not the standard UN projections. Because these project the trend 
between the last two censuses, they currently show lower IMR/U5MR estimates 
than actually exist and show them to be falling even when the reverse is all 
too evidently the case, e.g. Sudan, Angola, Mozambique, and at least until 
1986 Uganda. Per contra when mid and late 1980s censuses are available the 
recorded data will show a jump in many cases and the projections will show 
rises even if the rate is indeed falling. To avoid false optimism as to the 
starting point and unrealistic disappointment in the 1990s, up to date country 
based estimates should be used in target setting and monitoring.
Actual targets with identified institutional channels and programmes are 
needed in respect to women's workload, access to income and empowerment to 
improve household nutrition. These will in part have to be district specific 
and (especially as to income and nutrition) differentiate between urban and 
rural. Without workload reduction (including nearer health posts and pure 
water as well as affordable new technology) women will not have the time to 
take up literacy and continuing education, to devote more time to infant and 
young child care nor to produce and earn to improve child and family 
nutrition.
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Additional targets will be needed especially in respect to particularly 
prevalent and deadly diseases. One general case is malaria but others of 
concern in several countries include bilharzia, river blindness, yaws and 
yellow fever.
In pastoral economies main animal disease vectors may need specific attention 
because of epidemics' (pandemics') disastrous consequences on nutrition. 
Indeed in cases in which community based health care is relatively strong and 
veterinary service/drug availability very low (e.g. Somalia) using the 
community health workers' as a channel for providing basic veterinary as well 
as human drugs deserves exploration.
Aids cannot be ignored. However, it is not realistic to set quantitative 
targets. Even full scale screening is well beyond typical budgetary 
feasibility and intensive care and death delaying drugs even more so. Hospice 
or family care is about all that is possible on that front. What is 
practicable is education and more particularly mobilisation to make it less 
ineffective aimed at limiting the number of new infections.
Broader Targets: Household and National
As has been argued, overall macroeconomic targets in respect to growth, food 
production, government recurrent revenue, empowerment of small farmers to 
produce more, employment, minimum wages, exports, external resource inflows 
(including terms and conditions), and debt writeoff (or rescheduling on a long 
term, 2% or less interest basis) do have direct consequences for poor people 
and, therefore, poor children. Whether specific targets should be set by 
province/district and nationally for most as well as regionally is not - or 
should not be in question. But they rarely are set with much seriousness or 
local input. This may be the area in which civil society groups and UNICEF 
can make the most useful input with a watching brief on labour intensive 
employment, poor farmer friendly agricultural development (especially as it 
relates to household self-provisioning and to women) and overall food 
production targets, instruments and resource allocations.
To assert that all policies and projects must have a direct micro effect on 
poor households is hardly plausible. Measures to raise growth (which often
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include large dams and factories), to augment exports (which may or may not be 
labour intensive and/or offer markets to poor producers) and bolster the 
government revenue base are necessary for the creation and sustaining of a 
context in which households can claw their way out of absolute poverty. That 
they are not sufficient calls for participation and mobilisation to influence 
how resources, incomes, import capacity and recurrent revenue are used not a 
simplistic opposition to dams, fertiliser factories, integrated textile mills, 
medical schools and multi-rate sales taxes exempting basic food. Much more 
productive is likely to be a positive approach insisting on attention to and 
resources in support of small scale production, wage employment and basic 
services as well as of self-organisation and accountability.
On exports (and market access), aid and debt the primary need is usually 
external advocacy - a role which may be more effective if civil society groups 
and UNICEF in several African states act jointly helping to inform and to 
articulate UNICEF's global efforts.
Children In Peril: War, Drought, Stabilisation
War and drought are among the largest causes of Infant and Under 5 Mortality 
in SSA. In two sub-regions: Southern Africa and the Horn and certain 
countries elsewhere in SSA the price of war is appalling. The Southern 
African case has been articulated in Children On The Front Line and its 
indications of the overall costs and the impact of war on children is relevant 
even to civil wars with forces employing a lower degree of casual brutality 
and conscious terrorism than South Africa's proxies.
The cure lies in ending the war. All actors with power to speed that result 
have an obligation to exercise it. In the meantime three priorities exist:
a. building up emergency programmes and channels first to ensure survival 
and then rehabilitation of individuals and households, especially 
re-establishment of their economic base;
b. keeping as much of normal civil basic services and poor household 
production oriented programmes operating as possible to serve those less
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directly affected and to maintain a base for rapid re-expansion when 
peace (or a much lower level of hostilities) is achieved;
c. planning before peace what priority reconstruction actions are and what 
resources will be needed/can be used to carry them out.
Drought's impact - especially when so severe and in cases in which assistance 
to affected households is grossly late and or grossly inadequate resulting in 
abandoned homes and mass refugee movements - is in some ways analogous to war. 
The three priorities are the same.
One major obstacle to effective action on these priorities is the artificial 
separation of disaster (survival) relief from development assistance with the 
intermediate rehabilitation component lost between two bureaucracies. Another 
is the failure - by SSA governments almost as much as external cooperating 
bodies - to have monitoring and policy review/activation structures so that 
prompt response to disaster is possible. The absurdities of the bureaucratic 
rigidities and of the regular lateness of reaction (even in countries with 
ongoing war emergencies or repeated drought cycles) and speed of disengagement 
before rehabilitation is even well begun are more than conceptual, 
institutional and managerial inefficiencies. They kill people who could have 
been saved and leave in absolute poverty households who could have been helped 
to rehabilitate their livelihoods.
Therefore the creation of permanent negative shock monitoring, contingency 
planning bodies able to respond rapidly on the basis of using existing 
institutions and opening or expanding pre-identified programmes (as in 
Botswana) should be a priority in all SSA countries now without them. Where 
they are weak the priority is to stengthen them. These should include 
representatives of or liaise closely with civil society bodies and 
international cooperative partners.
Stabilisation does have overall negative initial consequences. Cutting 
private and public consumption is most unlikely to leave the poor untouched. 
Indeed while they have the poorest access to services and the lowest household 
income margins above bare survival, they also have the least market or 
political power and are thus likely to bear a disproportionate share of 
initial costs.
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Four approaches to mitigating (realistically total avoidance is rarely 
practicable) this type of disaster - and disaster it is to those most severely 
hit whatever the longer term gains to others - are:
a. rapid start-up of adjustment type programmes to restore growth and 
therefore limit the extent and duration of consumption falls;
b. immediate import support finance (including food aid) targetted on uses 
of particular value to poor households and to maintenance of basic 
services;
c. using a period of institutional change and policy alteration to push for 
adoption of specific interventions valuable to poor people and especially 
poor children (e.g. those in GOBI or the CSD more generally.
d. monitoring human condition changes of poor households, however 
approximately, on a quick reporting basis and intervening rapidly to 
reverse negative results.
While perhaps inadequately conceptualised and working under extreme 
data/personnel/resource limitations in a war setting, the Mozambican 
stabilisation/adjustment programmes have sought to act on those priorities. 
While there have been adverse consequences for some Mozambicans particularly 
in part of 1988, these have been more limited and more speedily reversed than 
could have been predicted and the overall trends for poor people have been 
positive (in itself a reversal of trend).
Mobilisation: From Campaigns to Structures
The need for more and more innovative mobilisation of knowledge and support at 
all levels from key decision-takers to the poor households to be empowered is 
now fairly widely accepted - which it was not a decade ago. However, the 
practice still tends to be episodic and campaign oriented. That, by itself is 
not enough.
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To have a head of state visit a primary health clinic and to organise a 
national vaccination/immunisation campaign are valuable in and of themselves. 
They are frequently essential starting points. But they should be seen as 
such rather - than as sometimes appears to be the case - as primarily ends in 
themselves and means to be replicated annually or (more generally) at longer 
intervals with falloffs inbetween.
What is needed is structures so that mobilisation is continuing, not followed 
by demobilisation. This means steady follow through in normal channels (and 
their upgrading) after initial campaigns - e.g. maternal and child 
vaccination/immunisations within an expanding ante-natal/well child component 
of primary health care. But the structures tend to go beyond government 
institutions into civil society at national, district and primary community 
(village, neighourhood, workplace levels). How to do this necessarily varies
- often within the same country on geographic lines much more complex than 
urban-rural - beginning to do it more generally is an important target for 
the 1990s.
Self Reliance: Desirable and Imperative
The bulk of the resources to transform the human dimension of African lives 
will be African or they will not be transformed. The bottom lines for this 
are that externally driven transformation is not lasting (and most unlikely 
to relate effectively to African human needs) and that - perhaps fortunately
- external resources and resource allocation priorities will not be adequate 
to cause a donor driven or even a primarily donor fuelled transformation.
Resources in this sense goes beyond finance, physical inputs and personnel. 
It also comprises institutions, strategic priority setting, sequencing, 
programme design, project articulation, choice of technology (in the broadest 
sense) and implementation. In many cases these resources are even less 
adequate today than the more usually cited financial-physical-personnel trio.
Mobilisation - to support action, to participate in it and to use, 
opportunities (whether for vaccination or new crops, continuing education or 
community infrastructure rehabilitation/development) must also be 
overwhelmingly African. The history of community development, basic needs, 
small farmer and similar programmes in African bears eloquent testimony for 
domestic mobilisation if any innovation is to grow, put down roots, flourish
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or survive vicissitudes. Mobilisation needs to interact with institution 
building and with community participation - too many otherwise useful 
programmes are in and for but not of communities and too many interventions 
are on a campaign basis with little institution building so that results 
plateau or erode and presently another campaign is needed and usually proves 
harder to motivate (a not uncommon feature in vaccination/immunisation and 
oral rehydration programmes).
Interaction with external actors is an area in which most SSA states and 
civil society institutions are weak - weaker than they need be. Failure to 
set out goals and proposed strategies, sequences, programmes, institutions 
and budgets and to negotiate when (not if) these are rejected or 
counterproposals mode weakens African and raises foreign influence. Often 
the results are counterproductive, nearly always they take the locus of 
decisions further away from poor African households, inevitably they weaken 
African commitment to and sense of ownership of what is agreed and done. And 
done in this context requires monitoring by Africans even more than by 
external parnters - many externally run programmes do not (for whatever 
reason) bear much resemblance to what the African side thought had been 
agreed.
A warning is in order. Africans are committed to the welfare of children and 
believe in social action (from household to state levels) to assist poor 
people to survive and to escape from poverty. That commitment is reflected 
in official circles (e.g. the 1988 Khartoum "Human Condition Declaration") 
and in some states' strategic prax is (e.g. Tanzania, Botswana, Zimbabwe, 
Mozambique, Cabo Verde).
But most African political leaders and economic decision takers do not see 
reduction of poverty as a central economic strategic elements. In part this 
relates to not perceiving basic service access and empowering poor people to 
produce more as central to economic recovery and development or to being 
unable to work out how this could be done. But in part it relates to the 
simple fact that the weight of poor people and their organisations are 
usually rather light in African civil societies and decision taking groups 
and, as a result, self interests of decision takers are not on their side. 
Explanation and information can help overcome the first two problems, only 
pressure by and dialogue from poor households and their African advocates can 
lead to broadly based, rapid or sustained progress toward reducing or 
replacing the last.
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External Support: A Necessary Input
That said SSA cannot pull itself back to 1970 much less achieve human 
condition - and in particular rapid child welfare and development progress 
solely from its own resources. The damage from post 1980 (or longer) shocks 
and stases(external or self imposed) is too great for that and the level of 
resources (physical, human, institutional) above bare survival and crisis 
containment too narrow. External roles can be summarised as augmenting, 
complementing and catalysing.
Augmenting means providing additional resources to fill gaps in an ongoing or 
potentially ongoing effort. Funding basic drugs within a basically 
functioning rural PHC programme (e.g. Tanzania from 1986) or providing a 
health budgetary and financial analysis expert for a health ministry planning 
and management team (as proposed in Mozambique) are examples.
Complementing is providing an additional programme which would not otherwise 
exist either because domestic resources are too think and otherwise committed 
to allow it or because those who want it prioritised do not have adequate 
influence on domestic resource allocations to get it. The external donor - 
community nexus PHC in Somalia and the supplementary feeding programmes of 
child health clinics in Ghana are examples.
Catalyzing involves mobilising and demonstrating (probably in part mobilising 
by demonstrating). The UNICEF building of an effective constituency for, 
belief in the practicability of and - more slowly - significant local 
resource allocations to mass immunisation/vaccination is an outstanding 
example.
Put differently external actors may be able to do a number of things. One is 
to mobilise support externally e.g. for finance, for personnel, for debt 
reduction, for better trade conditions both as to access to markets and as to 
terms of trade. Another is domestic advocacy working with domestic actors 
with similar concerns; a perfectly proper activity albeit one usually in 
danger of becoming too coercive or failing to allow the promoted programme to 
be domesticated. They can also include developing (e.g. a malaria vaccine) 
or transferring (e.g. improved pit latrine) technology as well as finance, 
specific physical inputs and personnel for operations, training and programme 
design.
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Different external actors have different strengths and weaknesses. Some non 
governmental organisations (and some smaller, nominally more technical 
intergovernmental bodies) have special abilities for external and -less 
uniformly - domestic support mobilisation. In addition they frequently find 
it easier to work with basic communities and poor people's organisations and 
to identify/transfer appropriate technology than do the "big battalions” of 
the international financial institutions and major bilateral donors. The 
latter, per contra have much better access to finance and greater technical 
capacity to deploy on debt reduction and Northern saarket access issues if a 
civil society and governmental base for finance* debt and trade changes 
exists. The case for a division of labour,, Fear ieteEtifying and acting on 
complementarity and for financially larger bodies using those with other 
strengths as programming channels is strong.
So is the case for clarity to .Africans. External advocacy should be 
identified as such to avoid ill founded Saopes it means the institution can 
provide the resources sought itself - a constant danger for UNICEF whose 
advocacy role has come to be very much larger tkan its financial size would 
suggest. The same applies to domestic advocacy, catalytic resource 
injections in new programmes and "pilot" operations. The external actor, 
should make plain the limits (in scope, tiiae, resource transfers) of its own 
possible role and stress the need for a parallel African build-up to "joint 
venture status" with the external cooperating partner seen as necessarily and 
desirably becoming the junior partner relatively rapidly.
Envoi
Most Africans have survived. Development as well as survival interventions 
are moving forward in much of SSA. In Southern Africa and the Horn the 
chances of a "peace dividend" before 2000 look much stronger than even a year 
ago and even more so in contrast to 19^5• More countries and more poor 
people have begun to reverse the negative trends symptomatic of the nearly 
region wide reality and perception of malaise that built up to a peak over 
1983-86. But time is not on the side of infants and young children or of 
poor households. Those under five dying who should be surviving number in 
excess of 3.000 a day. Both aid fatigue on the part of donors and adjustment 
fatigue in SSA are growing and have already reached dangerously high levels
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in many countries. Demonstrable progress is needed rapidly to reduce fatigue 
and refresh those seeking rehabilitation and renewed development. Absolute 
poverty reduction in general and child survival, welfare and development are 
among the areas in which such progress can be made as well as being of human 
and economic priority importance in themselves.
- a luta continua 
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August 1989
